CSB slams Texas City cost cutting

US federal investigators today blamed a fatal explosion at BP's Texas City refinery on cost cutting and poor risk management and called for tougher standards for the industry.

Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) chairwoman Carolyn Merritt blamed the explosion, which killed 15 people and injured 180 others, on "aging infrastructure, overzealous cost cutting, inadequate design and risk blindness".

The March 2005 explosion, the worst industrial accident in over 10 years, was caused when a distillation tower at the Texas plant was overfilled, triggering the emergency release of flammable liquid into a blowdown drum.

The 1950s-era drum overflowed, sending a liquid geyser-like release into the atmosphere where it ignited.

The CSB has said that BP executives were aware of equipment problems and procedures well before the explosion at the refinery, the third-largest in the US.

The board recommended in a report that refineries eliminate the use of blowdown drums for containing liquid and vapour produced during operational upsets and use flare systems to burn excess vapours.

"We want the industry to wake up," Merritt said. "Unfortunately, the weaknesses in design, equipment, programmes and safety investment that were identified in Texas City are not unique either to that refinery or to BP."

"We are calling on the industry to eliminate the type of atmospheric vent that caused the flammable release."

Merritt said the CSB had relied on companies to take the lead in safety issues, but added the BP investigation had uncovered a costcutting trend over the past decade that cut experienced employees, training programmes and safety efforts.

"Many people in positions of corporate responsibility tell me they are deeply concerned about a perceived erosion of safety culture and process safety management over the past decade," she said.

BP's own 2003 internal safety audit citing safety problems at Texas City and other BP sites was known to BP's executive management and to "someone at the board of director level", said the CSB's lead investigator, Don Holmstrom. He declined to identify executives or directors by name.

BP officials have acknowledged that senior managers were aware of problems at Texas City prior to the accident but dispute the claim that BP was not doing anything about the safety problems there, especially after board member John Manzoni became the company's top refining executive in 2002.

"Expenditures at Texas City began to increase and increase pretty dramatically to address plant infrastructure needs, and it is also clear that there was a sharp, very focused effort to improve safety and performance at the plant" after Manzoni took charge, BP spokesman Ronnie Chappell said.

The company's image has been further undermined since the blast after corrosion problems at its Prudhoe Bay oil field caused the worst-ever leak on Alaska's North Slope. BP is also under investigation for alleged market manipulation.

The American Petroleum Institute, which draws up recommendations for oil companies, said it would review the CSB findings and incorporate them into the suggested practices.

Holmstrom said the number of US refiners still using blowdown drums is unknown, as is the cost to upgrade such "antiquated" systems to incorporate flaring devices.

Merritt said she had "not determined" whether CSB staff will try to speak with BP chief executive John Browne about Texas City, citing BP's extensive co-operation with the agency's continuing investigation, Reuters reported.

A final report is expected in March.

"I feel this is beginning to get enough attention that changes will have to be made," Eva Rowe, who lost both parents in the BP blast and is suing the company, said after listening to the CSB's recommendations.